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HE 1993 Survey period' was somewhat unusual in terms of the distri-
bution of reported cases. Commercial paper and guaranty cases not
only predominated, but almost equalled the number of cases reported
under all other Chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code2 com-
bined. In addition to judicial activity reported during the Survey period, the
legislature adopted the first major revisions to the Code since 1983 when
Chapter 8 on Investment Securities 3 was substantially revised. The revisions
added a new Chapter 2A covering leases of personal property4 and a new
Chapter 4A covering certain aspects of electronic funds transfers not already
covered by federal law.5 Highlights of these revisions are discussed, later in
the text. 6 The legislature also repealed Chapter 6 of the Code dealing with
bulk transfers because more recent legislation to prevent fraudulent transfers
has made Chapter 6 unnecessary. 7
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Although the Texas Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a general
common law duty of good faith and fair dealing should be implied in every
contract, 8 it has held that such a duty exists when a "special relationship"
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M.,
Harvard University
1. The 1993 Survey period runs approximately from November of 1992 through October
of 1993.
2. Prior to September 1, 1993, the Texas Business & Commerce Code included eleven
chapters, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & 1991 &
Supp. 1993) [hereinafter the Code]. During the 1993 legislative session, Chapters 2A and 4A
were added to the Code with an effective date of September 1, 1993. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d
Leg., R.S., ch. 570, §§ 1-16, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2102 (Vernon). Chapter 2A covers
leases of personal property and Chapter 4A covers certain aspects of electronic funds transfers.
While there are usually several commercial paper and guaranty cases reported under Chapter
3 of the Code, Chapter 2 on the sale of goods and Chapter 9 on secured transactions, taken
together, typically account for a larger number of reported cases. Relatively few cases are
usually reported under the other chapters of the Code.
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.101-8.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2A.101-2A.532 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 & Supp.
1994).
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4A.101-4A5.07 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 &
Supp. 1994).
6. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
7. Act of May 29, 1993. 73d Leg. R.S., ch. 570, § 16(1), 1993. Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2147 (Vernon).
8. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
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exists between the contracting parties.9 Breach of this common law duty
sounds in tort and can give rise to the recovery of both actual and punitive
damages.' 0 Although Section 1.203 of the Code 1 also imposes a duty of
good faith in all transactions governed by the Code, this duty has been held
to create only a contractual obligation not allowing the recovery of punitive
damages. 12 The dichotomy between the damages allowed in tort as opposed
to the damages allowed in contract have tempted plaintiffs to argue for the
existence of a "special relationship" in a variety of circumstances.13 Thus
far these arguments have been unsuccessful. '4
In Central Savings & Loan Association v. Stemmons Northwest Bank,
N.A. 15 the beneficiary under a standby letter of credit contended that the
existence of the letter of credit was sufficient to create a "special relation-
ship" between the beneficiary and the issuer of the credit. The court noted
there was no evidence of a long-standing business relationship between the
parties and no evidence showing an element of trust or unequal bargaining
power to justify imposition of a common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing.' 6 The court concluded the relationship of the beneficiary and the
issuer was "an ordinary commercial contractual relationship" and did not
"constitute the 'special relationship' necessary to give rise to a common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing."' 7
B. ACCELERATION AND USURY
Section 1.208 of the Code is the basic statutory provision allowing acceler-
ation of an instrument.' 8 Texas caselaw has added a considerable gloss,
however, to the manner in which an acceleration may be effected and has
imposed special notice requirements on creditors seeking to accelerate a
9. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
10. Id. at 168.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
12. Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, writ denied).
13. See, e.g., id. (supplier-distributor does not constitute a "special relationship"); Crim
Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595 n. 5 (Tex. 1992) (no
"special relationship" between franchisee and franchisor); FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706,
709 (Tex. 1990) (no "special relationship" implied between creditor and guarantor); Cockrell
v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 116 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (no
"special relationship" between lender and borrower); Lovell v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
754 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (no "special relationship" be-
tween mortgagor and mortgagee).
14. See cases collected in the preceding note. To date the Texas courts have adhered to
the "special relationship" categories described by the supreme court in FDIC v. Coleman, 795
S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
15. 848 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
16. Id. at 239-40.
17. Id. at 240.
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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debt. 19 In Miller v. University Savings Association20 the court considered
whether the requirement that notice of intent to accelerate be given before
the acceleration takes place applies to a guarantor as well as to the maker of
a note. The court reasoned that, while a guaranty may incorporate some of
the terms of a note, it is also a separate contract between the guarantor and
the creditor creating separate obligations between those parties.21 The court
concluded Texas law does not require a creditor to give notice of intent to
accelerate to a guarantor prior to the acceleration. 22 Additionally, the court
held that a claim for usury asserted by the guarantor was barred for failure
to assert the claim in the trial court. Regardless of the bar, the court opined
that the guaranty, by its own terms, was not usurious. 23
A useful technique for avoiding a usury violation is by inclusion of a sav-
ings clause in the note or guaranty. Such a clause should specify that noth-
ing in the instrument entitles the creditor to collect interest in an amount
greater than that allowed by law and that the debtor will never be required
to pay any interest in excess of the maximum legal amount. This technique
was used in First State Bank v. Dorst24 where deeds of trust allowed the
creditor to increase the interest rate by not more than two percent if the
property was sold while the note was still outstanding. While the escalation
of interest did not state a cap and was theoretically unlimited in its effect if
the property were sold several times while the note was outstanding, the
court gave effect to the savings clause as an effective limit on the amount of
interest that could be charged under the note.25 The court cautioned, how-
ever, that an instrument usurious on its face and in direct contradiction to a
savings clause would still be held usurious because a savings clause is only
effective to cure open-ended provisions which may or may not amount to
usury. 26
The court reached a similar result in Bernie's Custom Coach of Texas, Inc.
v. Small Business Administration27 where a debtor claimed a promissory
note was usurious because the language of the note permitted acceleration of
the entire indebtedness, including interest not yet earned at the time of accel-
eration, even though the creditor had never made a claim for such interest.
The note also contained a savings clause expressly stating that the interest
19. The best summary of the requirements for proper acceleration is contained in Shum-
way v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1991). The requirements specified in
Shumway are: (1) the note must be presented or demand for payment must be made to the
maker; (2) the creditor must give notice of an intent to accelerate; and (3) the maker must be
separately notified of the actual acceleration. Id. These requirements can be waived, but any
such waiver must clearly state the rights being waived.
20. 858 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36-37.
24. 843 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
25. Id. at 794.
26. Id. at 793. The court stated the following example to illustrate this proposition. "[A]
creditor may not specifically contract for a thirty percent interest rate and then avoid the
imposition of usury penalties by relying on a savings clause that declares an intention not to
collect usurious interest." Id.
27. 987 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
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rate on the note would never exceed that allowed by law. Because the note,
on its face, did not state a usurious rate and a usurious charge would result
only if unearned interest were actually claimed as part of an acceleration, the
court gave effect to the savings clause and held no usury violation had
occurred. 28
II. SALES OF GOODS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 2
A fundamental tenet of Chapter 2 is that it applies to "transactions in
goods."'29 "Goods" are defined in Section 2.105 as "all things (including
specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale .... ",30 In Franklin v. Jackson3' the court
determined that a peanut allotment approved by the Agricultural Conserva-
tion and Stabilization Service 32 did not qualify as "goods" under Chapter 2
and that an attempted "sale" of the allotment for a period of four years was
actually a lease rather than a sale.33 Despite use of the terms "seller" and
"buyer" and references to "sale" of the allotment in the contract between the
parties, the court reasoned that title to the allotment remained with the
transferor and the allotment would return to the transferor at the end of the
four year period. 34 The court was bolstered in its reasoning by a contract
requirement specifying payments to be made annually based on the number
of pounds of peanuts permitted under the allotment and by a contract re-
quirement that the transferee was to return the allotment to the transferor at
the end of four years in exchange for the nominal payment of one dollar. 35
Although a sale of goods is clearly within the scope of Chapter 2, other
statutes may affect certain incidents of the sale contract. In Maley v. 7111
Southwest Freeway, Inc. 36 the court held that a seller could not charge a
documentary fee for the processing of documents related to the sale of boats
sold on credit to several purchasers. The seller argued that the provisions of
the Texas Consumer Credit Code 37 permitting documentary fees in the sale
of certain motor vehicles should be read to permit such fees in the sale of
boats. The court held that, based on general principles of statutory con-
struction, the Consumer Credit Code authorized documentary fees only for
28. Id. at 1197.
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
31. 847 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
32. Allotments are made by the Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Service for
various commodities as a means of controlling the quantities of those commodities to be grown
in any given year through subsidies provided by the Department of Agriculture.
33. 847 S.W.2d at 309.
34. Id. at 308. The court noted that a "sale" under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price."
35. Id. at 309.
36. 843 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
37. Id. at 231-32. The specific provision in dispute was TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-6.10(a) (Vernon 1987) which allows documentary fees in the sale of a "motorcycle, a
motor-driven cycle, moped, or all terrain vehicle."
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the classes of vehicles listed in the statute and did not encompass other
modes of transportation not specifically listed.38
B. GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
Simple fact situations sometimes give courts the opportunity to clearly
elucidate the meaning and operation of complex statutory provisions. One
such case is Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc. 39 A jewelry store sold a Rolex
watch to a purchaser for almost ninety-five hundred dollars in exchange for
a check which the purchaser had forged. The store, of course, was unaware
of the forgery. On the very next day the purchaser offered to sell the watch
for some thirty-five hundred dollars to a used car dealer. After some discus-
sion and a call by the car dealer to the jewelry store to verify that the pur-
chaser had actually obtained the watch from the store, the dealer bought the
watch and took possession of it. After the original purchaser's check was
returned unpaid, the jewelry store sued the car dealer for conversion of the
watch. In a careful analysis of Section 2.403 of the Code,4° the court deter-
mined that the original purchaser had acquired the watch under a "transac-
tion of purchase," 41 that the original purchaser had acquired a voidable title
through the voluntary delivery of the watch in exchange for the forged
check, 42 and that the purchaser had the ability to transfer a good title to a
good faith purchaser for value.43 The court then considered the evidence
adduced on whether the car dealer qualified as a good faith purchaser for
value.4" The court found sufficient evidence in the record to impugn the
dealer's good faith, including some evidence tending to show knowledge the
transaction was unlawful, admitted misrepresentations during the phone
conversation with the jewelry store, and knowledge that the price asked for
the watch was extremely low for a watch of this quality. 45 The court con-
cluded the car dealer did not qualify as a good faith purchaser for value and
the jewelry store, therefore, was entitled to return of the watch. 46
C. WARRANTIES
Warranties of quality may arise under the Code either as express warran-
ties made by the seller as part of the sales transaction47 or as implied warran-
38. 843 S.W.2d at 231.
39. 844 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
40. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
41. "Transaction of purchase" is an undefined term under the Code and the court, finding
no Texas case law in point, looked to cases from other jurisdictions to aid in the interpretation
of this term. 844 S.W.2d at 922.
42. Here, again, the court looked to cases from other jurisdictions because no Texas cases
were in point. Id.
43. This analysis correctly applies the provisions of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.403(a) and its concept of creating a voidable, rather than void, title in a purchaser who
obtains goods by voluntary delivery even though the delivery may have been induced by fraud-
ulent deception.
44. 844 S.W.2d at 923-24.
45. Id. at 924.
46. Id. at 925.
47. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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ties imposed by operation of law as an incident of the sale.48 In some
instances, the Code warranties may be supplemented or supplanted by an-
other statute, such as the Manufactured Housing Act.49 In Thurston v.
Green Tree Acceptance of Texas, Inc. 50 the disappointed buyer of a mobile
home sued the manufacturer, the seller, and the company that financed the
sale for breach of express and implied warranties and for violations of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).51 The principal defense
raised by the manufacturer and financer on a motion for summary judgment
was that the Manufactured Housing Act operated to bar all of the pur-
chaser's claims because of the purchaser's failure to allow the manufacturer
or retailer to perform the warranty service necessary to correct defects in the
mobile home.52 The summary judgment evidence showed, however, that the
purchaser had permitted repairs to be attempted on eight separate occasions
and only after it became apparent that the repairs were unsuccessful and the
same problems continued to recur did the purchaser refuse to allow further
repairs. In the view of the court, the purpose of the Act would be frustrated
if the purchaser could not, at some point, bring an action for breach of war-
ranty after a series of unsuccessful attempts at repair.53 Summary judgment
in favor of the manufacturer and financer was reversed. 54 Summary judg-
ment in favor of the retailer was upheld, however, on an interesting technical
ground - the retailer did not exist at the time of the purchase because its
articles of incorporation had not yet been issued at the time of the sale. 55
The purchaser had simply sued the wrong party.
In Pako Corp. v. Thomas56 the court applied the four year limitations pe-
riod contained in section 2.725 of the Code to conclude that an action for
breach of warranty was barred where the action was not brought until some
four years and two months after the goods were delivered to the buyer. 57
The court correctly held that attempts by the manufacturer to repair the
goods did not toll the running of the statute of limitations and that no war-
ranty was made that explicitly extended to the future performance of the
goods. 58
An express warranty made by a bank in Thigpen v. Sparks,59 to the effect
that a trust company sold by the bank had a "continuous and uninterrupted
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314-2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
49. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f (Vernon 1987).
50. 853 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, writ denied).
51. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1991).
52. 853 S.W.2d at 808. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 17(d) (Vernon Supp.
1987) provides: "A consumer's refusal to allow the manufacturer or retailer to perform war-
ranty service pursuant to the rules of the department is a bar to any cause of action for failure
to perform warranty service."
53. 853 S.W.2d at 809.
54. Id. at 810.
55. Id.
56. 855 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, n.w.h.).
57. Id. at 219. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
provides that a breach of warranty occurs upon tender of delivery of the goods.
58. Id. at 219-20.
59. 983 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1993).
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status of good standing" was one of the most interesting warranty cases de-
cided during the Survey period. Although the express warranty concerned
corporate status rather than quality of goods, the fundamental issue in the
case is important for express warranties under Chapter 2 of the Code as well.
After the sale took place, the buyer learned that the trust company's charter
had been forfeited for a brief time due to non-payment of corporate franchise
taxes. The buyer was unable to resell the trust company after making this
discovery and sued the selling bank for breach of its express warranty, claim-
ing damages for the lost sale. The selling bank subsequently failed and was
placed in FDIC receivership. The FDIC asserted that, under the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine and its progeny, 6° the warranty claim was barred and could
not be asserted as a claim against the FDIC. In a careful opinion analyzing
the language and underlying policy of the doctrine and its statutory codifica-
tions, the court concluded that a breach of express warranty claim was not
the type of agreement barred by operation of "D'Oench, Duhme.' '61 The
court cogently summarized its analysis by noting that such an application of
the doctrine would transform it "from a provision protecting the failed
bank's loan portfolio from D'Oench-like secret agreements into a meat-axe
for avoiding debts incurred in the ordinary course of business."'62
D. REMEDIES FOR NON-DELIVERY
In Palmco Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc. 63 an airline contracted with a
manufacturer of flatware to supply knives, spoons, and forks for inflight
meals for a period of one year. Deliveries by the manufacturer were consist-
ently late and some deliveries never took place at all. The airline eventually
notified the manufacturer that the late deliveries were unacceptable and that
the airline intended to hold the manufacturer to the contract terms. Follow-
ing receipt of this notice, the manufacturer refused to make further deliveries
unless the airline agreed to pay a price increase of approximately twenty-five
percent for the future deliveries. The airline was unable to purchase substi-
tute goods from other sources and ultimately agreed to the price increase.
Some three months later, the airline notified the manufacturer that it was
setting off all damages for delayed delivery and non-delivery against the ac-
count balance owed to the manufacturer. At this point the manufacturer
refused to make any further deliveries under the contract and sued to re-
cover the outstanding account balance. The court held the airline had ade-
quately complied with section 2.607 of the Code requiring notification of
60. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine originated in the now-famous case of D'Oench,
Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), where the Supreme Court held that a bank
customer was estopped from asserting a defense based on an unrecorded oral agreement with a
failed bank in an action brought by the FDIC to collect a debt owed by the customer. The
purpose of the doctrine was to prevent deception of bank regulators by unrecorded, secret
agreements entered into by a failed bank. The doctrine has been expanded and codified in 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988) and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (1988).
61. 983 F.2d at 649.
62. Id.
63. 983 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1993).
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breach to hold a seller liable for damages under the Code.64 The court fur-
ther held the airline could recover as damages the increased amount it spent
on effecting "cover" when it purchased flatware from other suppliers after
the manufacturer refused to make further deliveries. 65 In the most interest-
ing portion of the opinion, the court considered whether the airline could
also recover additional damages under a liquidated damages clause in the
contract. 66 On this point the court held the liquidated damages clause com-
pensated the airline for damage to reputation and for costs associated with
revising meal schedules and serving of meals which could not be ascertained
with reasonable certainty. 67 Because these damages were distinct from the
damages associated with effecting cover, the award of liquidated damages
did not duplicate the cover damages and could properly be awarded.68 Dam-
ages for the price increase were also proper because the agreement to the
increase had been obtained through duress when the airline was unable to
find other suppliers at the time the increase was demanded. 69 The manufac-
turer was allowed to setoff, at the original contract rate, a balance due for
unpaid past deliveries and a net judgment was entered in favor of the
airline. 70
III. LEASES UNDER THE NEW CHAPTER 2A
Space is too short to do more than summarize the highlights of the new
Chapter 2A in this Survey article. Chapter 2A governs leases of personal
property. 7' Except for the lease of fixtures, it does not affect real property
leases. 72 Perhaps the most important effect of Chapter 2A is that, for the
first time, Texas now has a single, comprehensive statement of law on the
subject of personal property lease transactions. The only previous source of
law in this area consisted of a handful of cases and general contract or tort
principles applied to the terms of the lease itself. Chapter 2A now permits
more predictable drafting of leases, as well as stating the rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties under a lease contract with each other and with third
parties who might deal with the leased goods.73
To a large extent, Chapter 2A is a combination of rules derived from
Chapter 2 on sale of goods transactions and Chapter 9 on secured transac-
tions. For example, Chapter 2A includes several sections whose content is
64. Id. at 685. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
requires a buyer to give notice of breach within a reasonable time after discovery or "be barred
from any remedy."
65. Id. at 686-87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.712 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
allows a buyer to purchase substitute goods as "cover" for goods that are not delivered under a
sales contract.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 687.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 687-88.
70. Id. at 689.
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
72. Id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.309 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994) deals
with fixture leases.
73. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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almost identical to parallel sections in Chapter 2 with the substitution of the
word "lease" for the word "sale." Thus, both Chapters 2 and 2A have sec-
tions dealing with offer and acceptance, 74 statute of frauds requirements, 75
parol evidence, 76 warranties of merchantability, 77 risk of loss, 7 8 unconscio-
nability, 79 anticipatory repudiation,80 substituted performance, 81 and ex-
cused performance.82 While the parallels between Chapter 2A and Chapter
9 are less pronounced, both Chapters have sections dealing with the priority
of third-party claims, 83 rights of the parties when goods become fixtures, 84
rights and remedies on default, 85 and standards for the disposition of repos-
sessed goods.86 Chapter 2A also adds some special sections, however, deal-
ing with the unique attributes of lease transactions, such as the lessor's right
to sue for the present value of unpaid rent87 and protection of the lessor's
residual interest in the goods.88
Chapter 2A draws a major distinction between two categories of lease
transactions. The first, and simplest, category is the direct lease of goods by
a lessee from a lessor who is also the supplier of the goods. This category is
exemplified by a transaction in which a farmer leases harvesting equipment
directly from a farm implement dealer who supplies the goods under a lease
agreement requiring the farmer to pay rent to the dealer for a specified term
with the equipment to be returned to the dealer at the end of the term. The
second, and more complex category, consists of those transactions in which
the only function of the lessor is to finance the acquisition of the goods by
the lessee by paying a third-party supplier for the goods and immediately
delivering them to the lessee under a lease agreement. Such transactions,
denominated as "finance leases" under Chapter 2A,89 are akin to purchase
money loan transactions where a financing entity pays the supplier of goods,
but does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods and delivery is made
directly from the supplier to the purchaser. 90 In such purchase money loan
transactions, the financer is removed from disputes about the quality of the
goods or the quality of performance under the sales contract and can enforce
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.206, 2A.206 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1994).
75. Id. §§ 2.201, 2A.201.
76. Id. §§ 2.202, 2A.202.
77. Id. §§ 2.314, 2A.212.
78. Id. §§ 2.509, 2A.509.
79. Id. §§ 2.302, 2A. 108.
80. Id. §§ 2.610, 2A.402.
81. Id. §§ 2.614, 2A.404.
82. Id. §§ 2.615, 2A.405.
83. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2A.307, 9.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 & Supp.
1994).
84. Id. §§ 2A.309, 9.313.
85. Id. §§ 2A.525, 9.503.
86. Id. §§ 2A.527, 9.504.
87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2A.529 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
88. Id. § 2A.532.
89. The definition of a "finance lease" appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2A.103(a)(7) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
90. The requirements of a purchase money security interest are described in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.107 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
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the right to payment without regard to such disputes. Under a finance lease,
the lessor also has such immunity from disputes about the goods under the
provisions of Chapter 2A.9 1
The concept of a "finance lease" is perhaps the most important innovation
added to Texas law by Chapter 2A by providing financing entities with an
additional option in planning financing transactions, particularly for expen-
sive commercial equipment or other expensive goods (for example,
automobiles). The independence and irrevocability of the lessee's obligations
under a finance lease are made explicit under Chapter 2A. 92
Consumer leases receive a degree of separate treatment under Section
2A. 104 which explicitly makes Chapter 2A subject to any special protections
consumers may have under other provisions of Chapter 2A or under other
law.93 A consumer lease is created under Article 2A if the leased goods are
acquired primarily for personal, family, or household use and the lessee is
obligated to pay less than $25,000 in rental payments during the term of the
lease.94
IV. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. ISSUES OF FORM AND FORMALITIES
Section 3.104 of the Code lists the requirements a writing must have to
qualify as a negotiable instrument.95 When signatures on an instrument are
admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles the holder to
recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense. 96 In both Texmarc
Conveyor Co. v. Arts97 and Edlund v. Bounds,98 the court held that writings
forming the basis of the respective plaintiffs' claims qualified as promissory
91. The protection of the finance lessor from liability about the quality of the goods sup-
plied under a finance lease is described in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A. 103 Cmt. g
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
92. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.407(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994) pro-
vides: "In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, a term in the lease agreement
that provides that the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and in-
dependent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods is enforceable."
The Official Comment of this Section points out: "This section extends the benefits of the
classic 'hell or high water' clause to a finance lease that is not a consumer lease. This section is
self-executing; no special provision need be added to the contract."
93. One of the most important of these protections is a cross reference to the Texas De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.565 (Vernon 1991).
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.103(a)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
This definition of a "consumer lease" in Chapter 2A will create some interpretive questions
about the relationship between Chapter 2A and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act because the
definition of "consumer" under the DTPA is much broader and includes "an individual, part-
nership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires
by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term does not include a business
consumer that has assets of twenty-five million dollars or more." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.45(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). There will presumably be leases which do not
qualify as "consumer leases" under Chapter 2A and, hence, do not receive special treatment
under that Chapter, but in which the lessee is still a "consumer" for purposes of the DTPA.
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
96. Id. § 3.307.
97. 857 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
98. 842 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
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notes under the Code and, absent proof of any valid defenses, the defendant
makers were liable on the instruments.99
In Martin v. Ford an instrument contained all of the requisites specified in
Section 3.104, but merely stated "1986" as a date of issue without indicating
a specific day, and had no statement of a date for payment. 100 Action was
brought on the note in 1991. The court properly recognized that notes con-
taining no time for payment are generally treated as demand notes and that
the statute of limitations on demand instruments begins to run on the date of
issue. 10' Application of this general rule would have barred enforcement of
the note as suit was not filed until after expiration of the four year statute of
limitations.102 The court also ruled, however, that if the parties intended to
require a demand before a cause of action would accrue, the statute of limi-
tations would not begin to run until demand was made, provided the de-
mand occurred within a reasonable time after issue.'0 3 The court held the
evidence before it was sufficient to uphold the ruling of the trial court that
demand was a required condition precedent and that demand had been made
within a reasonable time after the date of issuance. 104 The action was
timely, therefore, because it was brought within four years after the demand
for payment took place.' 0 5
B. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
One of the more important and currently unsettled questions surrounding
the application of a statute of limitations to claims based on a negotiable
instrument involves choosing between the state four-year limitations period
and the federal six-year limitations period when an instrument is transferred
by the FDIC to an assignee or holder. Conflicting results have been reached
by the Texas courts of appeals and writs have been granted to resolve the
conflict. 10 6 The basic fact situation arises when the assets of a failed finan-
cial institution are acquired by the FDIC, including assets in the form of
instruments representing debts owed by borrowers from the institution. As
99. 857 S.W.2d at 746; 842 S.W.2d at 724.
100. 853 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
101. Id. at 682.
102. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
103. 853 S.W.2d at 682-83.
104. Id. at 683. On this point, the court noted that this rule of general contract law had
survived enactment of the Code. A revised version of Article Three of the Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code promulgated in 1990 contains more elaborate limitations provi-
sions than the current Code and changes the rule in cases where no demand is made from an
inquiry into intent of the parties and whether a reasonable time for demand has passed into an
absolute limitations period of ten years when neither principal nor interest has been paid for a
continuous ten year period. U.C.C. § 3-118(b) (1990). The revised version of Article Three
has not yet been adopted in Texas.
105. 853 S.W.2d at 683.
106. Federal Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly, 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, writ granted) and Thweatt v. Jackson, 838 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
granted). These cases were consolidated and the Supreme Court decided that a purchaser
from the FDIC obtains the benefit of the 6 year Statute of Limitations. As a result, Thweatt
was affirmed; and Federal Debt Mgmt. was reversed. Both cases, however, were remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. See 1994 LEXIS 39; 37 Tex. Sup. J. 555 (1994).
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part of the liquidation process, such assets, including the instruments, are
often sold to private entities. Under federal law, the FDIC is entitled to a
six-year limitations period to sue on the instruments; 0 7 in the hands of a
private party, however, Texas law allows only a four-year limitations period
to commence an action. 08 This factual setting presents the courts with a
clear choice: is a transferee of the assets bound by the shorter state limita-
tions period, or does the transferee obtain the advantage of the longer federal
limitations period?
One of the factors involved in choosing between these conflicting time pe-
riods is whether the rights of a transferee in an instrument are the same as
those of the transferor. 0 9 In Thweatt v. JacksonI10 the Austin Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that this doctrine operated to give the transferee of an instru-
ment the benefit of the six-year federal statute of limitations. In Federal
Debt Management, Inc. v. Weatherly"I the Dallas Court of Appeals de-
clined to follow the reasoning in Thweatt and held, inter alia, that a statute
of limitations limits the substantive right to assert a claim and is, therefore,
not a "right" transferable to a transferee." 2
Other factors to be considered in making a choice between the different
limitations periods are whether federal holder in due course protection per-
mits a transferee to utilize the federal limitation period, whether federal pre-
emption mandates use of the six-year period, and whether public policy
favoring use of the federal period overrides language in the statute giving the
FDIC the benefit of the six-year rule, without mentioning suits brought by
transferees from the agency. " a It on this last factor perhaps that resolution
of the issue may turn. Although the statute clearly gives the FDIC the right
to sue for a six-year period following accrual of a cause of action, the statute
is silent on whether this right is itself assignable." 14 The statute, however, is
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(14) (Supp. 1 1989) states the six-year limitations period applica-
ble to actions by the FDIC and the RTC. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988) allowed a similar period
for actions by the now-abolished FSLIC.
108. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004, 16.035 (Vernon 1986).
109. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
the transferee of an instrument acquires "such rights as the transferor had therein." This rule
is a statutory enactment of the general common law shelter doctrine. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.201 Cmt. 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
110. 838 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ granted).
111. 842 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted).
112. Id. at 774-78. In Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993), the court of appeals
held that TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) gave the
transferee the benefit of the longer six-year federal limitations period. In its per curiam denial
of a writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court noted that it neither approved nor disapproved the
opinion of the court of appeals on this issue.
113. Thweatt and Jackson are diametrically opposed on how these factors should be ap-
plied to the limitations issue. See also Jon Luce Builder, Inc. v. First Gibraltar Bank, 849
S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied), in which the Austin Court of Appeals
stated its continued adherence to use of the federal limitations period.
114. In pertinent part, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (1988) provides "[Tlhe applicable stat-
ute of limitations with regard to any action brought by [the FDIC] as conservator or receiver
shall be .... "
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equally silent on whether assignability of this right is prohibited.' 15 If the
FDIC has power to transfer assets in the course of a liquidation proceeding
(as it does have), that power would seem to carry with it by implication the
ability to sell assets at the best obtainable price. Unless prohibited from do-
ing so, the FDIC should be able to sell its right to sue under the six-year
limitations period along with the asset being sold as an implied power rea-
sonably necessary to carry out the intent of Congress to facilitate private
disposition and collection of assets. The best contrary argument against this
line of reasoning is that the rights and powers of a government agency are
vested exclusively in the agency and cannot be sold. In this situation, how-
ever, the FDIC is acting in the dual role of public agency to insure bank
deposits and resolve claims against failed institutions and as a seller of assets
that were originally issued in private transactions. In this latter role, it is
much like a "value-added reseller" when it acquires an asset through a bank
failure, adds a six-year limitations period, and resells the asset for an amount
greater than the asset would bring under a four-year limitations period.
A variation on this issue of choosing the proper limitations period arose in
Prince v. First City, Texas - Houston,'1 6 where an instrument was trans-
ferred from a failing bank to a transferee through an open bank assistance
transaction."17 The court held the transferee was not entitled to use of the
six-year limitation period because the FDIC had never acquired the asset as
a receiver and the rights of the transferee were limited, therefore, to the
rights of the transferor bank under the four-year state limitations period. I "
In Mills v. FDIC"1 9 the court considered whether the FDIC could utilize
the six year limitations rule if it chose to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure
rather than bringing a legal action. Based on the public policy underlying
FDIC liquidation of failed financial institutions, the court held that the six
year limitations period could be used in either judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosures.
A different limitations issue was addressed in Peterson v. Texas Commerce
Bank - Austin, N.A. 120 where the court held that filing of a bankruptcy
proceeding tolled the state limitations period during the pendency of the
bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy court determined that the amount owing
on a note signed by the debtor was nondischargeable because the loan was
obtained under false pretenses, tolling of the limitations period allowed the
115. The court recognized this point in FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1993), in
holding that an assignee from the FSLIC acquired the right to sue under the six-year federal
limitations period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988). At this writing, Bledsoe is probably
the best-reasoned and best-articulated opinion on the issue of choosing between conflicting
limitations periods in the context of assignments by the FDIC.
116. 853 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
117. An open bank assistance transaction is one in which the FDIC facilitates the acquisi-
tion of assets by a financially sound bank from a financially troubled bank without an interven-
ing receivership and liquidation.
118. 853 S.W.2d at 694. The court noted that it had previously addressed the same issue in
City of Houston v. First City, 827 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1992, writ
denied), and would adhere to that opinion.
119. 821 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
120. 844 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
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creditor to sue on the debt even though more than four years had passed
since maturity of the note.' 21
C. MAKERS' DEFENSES TO ENFORCEMENT OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS
It is a great advantage for the transferee of a negotiable instrument to
qualify as a holder in due course. 122 To become a holder in due course, the
transferee must first become a "holder," a feat accomplished by taking the
instrument through "negotiation," a method of transfer defined in section
3.202 of the Code. 123 If a transferee does not qualify as a holder in due
course, however, all is not necessarily lost; the transferee merely becomes
subject to a wider range of defenses. In Northwestern National Insurance Co.
v. Crockett 124 the defendant maker moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the notes in question were not negotiable and that the transferee
had acquired them by simple assignment rather than by negotiation.
Although the court agreed that the transferee did not qualify as a holder
and, hence, could not be a holder in due course, the defendant failed to show
the existence of any defense to payment. 125 Summary judgment in favor of
the defendant was, therefore, improper and the case was remanded for trial
on the merits of the plaintiff's claim for payment. 126
Claims of material alteration as a defense to liability were raised in two
cases decided during the Survey period. 127 In FDIC v. Plato 128 the altera-
tion consisted of the issuer's changing the name of the beneficiary in an ap-
plication for a letter of credit and in the letter of credit itself to conform
those documents to an understanding between the account party and the
beneficiary. In addition the account party signed a blank note in favor of the
issuer. After a draw was made under the letter of credit, the issuer filled in
the blanks in the amount of $350,000, the amount specified in the letter of
credit and previously agreed to by the account party. Although the account
party subsequently made several payments on the note to the issuing bank,
when the issuer failed and was taken over by the FDIC, the account party
121. Id. at 295.
122. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) a holder in
due course holds an instrument free from the claims of any person to the instrument and is
subject only to the limited group of defenses listed in that section. In contrast, a transferee
who fails to qualify as a holder in due course is subject to the claims of other persons to the
instrument and to a much wider variety of defenses. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.306 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
123. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). If a negotiable
instrument is payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery alone; if it is payable to order,
negotiation requires delivery together with the indorsement of the prior holder. If a transferee
qualifies as a holder, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) fur-
ther requires that the instrument be taken for value, in good faith, and without notice of claims
or defenses before the transferee can qualify as a holder in due course.
124. 857 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
125. Id. at 758.
126. Id.
127. FDIC v. Plato, 981 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1993) and First State Bank v. Keilman, 851
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
128. 981 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1993).
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resisted payment to the FDIC on the ground of material alteration. The
court held that alteration of the application and letter of credit would not
work a discharge of liability because those documents did not cross-reference
the note, which was the actual instrument evidencing the debt.129 As to the
note, the court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine 30 precluded a claim
of discharge because the account party had signed a blank note that could
have the effect of misleading bank examiners within the meaning of the doc-
trine because the note itself also had no cross-reference to the terms of the
letter of credit.13'
In First State Bank v. Keilman 132 a renewal note signed by the makers
originally provided that interest would be repaid at "the prime rate... plus
Two percent (12.5%) per annum."' 33 The amount stated in parentheses was
later deleted by the lending bank and replaced with "(2%)." Although the
jury found the change took place without the consent of the makers, there
were no findings that the change was material or fraudulent. 34 Further-
more, the court noted that the change was not material as a matter of law
because, by application of the usual rule that words control figures, the legal
effect of the contract was not changed. 135
In RTC v. Cook 136 the makers borrowed money from a savings associa-
tion to make home improvements. The loan was secured by a construction
contract and deed of trust on the makers' residence. As required by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, the contract contained the FTC "Holder in Due
Course" notice. 137 When the contractor failed to complete the improve-
ments, the makers refused to make further payments and sued both the con-
tractor and the savings association for DTPA violations. At trial, the court
granted a directed verdict against the makers on the DTPA claim asserted
against the savings association, but permitted a trial amendment allowing
the makers to state a new claim based on a theory of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. 38 Under this theory the makers alleged the savings asso-
ciation had harassed the makers in an attempt to collect the debt, resulting
129. Id. at 856-57.
130. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is described in note 60, supra.
131. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine has been routinely applied to "blank note" cases. See,
e.g., FDIC v. Caporale, 931 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.
1988); FDIC v. Morrison, 816 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1987); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512
(5th Cir. 1986); FDIC v. Hatmaker, 756 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985). FDIC. v. McClanahan is a
"fun" case and is required reading for anyone interested in understanding application of the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. The case is discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 173, 181-82 (1987).
132. 851 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
133. Id. at 919.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 920. The court cited Guthrie v. National Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495
(Tex. 1965) as authority for this rule of legal interpretation. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.118(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states the same rule.
136. 840 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
137. The requirement that certain consumer credit contracts contain a notice that holders
of the contract remain subject to a consumer's claims and defenses appears in 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.2 (1993).
138. 840 S.W.2d at 44.
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in emotional distress to one of the makers. The defendants moved for a
short continuance on the ground of surprise, but this motion was denied.139
After trial, but before judgment, the RTC entered the picture as conservator
for the savings association, thus injecting D'Oench, Duhme considerations
into the case. The trial court ultimately entered judgment on the jury verdict
in favor of the makers on their DTPA claim against the contractor and
against the savings association on the emotional distress claim. Under the
FTC holder in due course rule, the trial court also ruled that damages as-
sessed against the contractor were recoverable against the association as
holder of the consumer credit contract. 140
Two major issues were presented on appeal. First, could the theory of
negligent infliction of emotional distress be asserted against the RTC? Sec-
ond, under the FTC holder in due course rule, could damages awarded
against the contractor be used as the basis for a money judgment against the
RTC?
The RTC argued the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress
was barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine because the claim was based on
acts not contained in the books and records of the savings association. The
court properly ruled, however, that any tortious acts committed by the asso-
ciation were independent of any agreement with the association and, there-
fore, were not within the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. 141 The court of appeals
did, however, uphold the RTC on the alternative argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to allow the short continuance requested
by the defendant association. 142 A retrial was ordered on the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress theory.143
As to the operation of the FTC holder in due course rule, the court held
that the rule permits a consumer to obtain refund of amounts paid under a
consumer credit contract and that such refund can be obtained from a subse-
quent holder of the contract, whether or not that holder was the initial recip-
ient of the payments.'I" The court ruled that a money judgment against the
RTC was proper to the extent of payments the consumers had made to the
contractor. 145
A different type of defense was asserted in Moore v. Liddell, Sapp, Zivley,
Hill & LaBoon,146 where a borrower argued that a loan made to him in his
own capacity was usurious because, as a condition of the loan, he was re-
quired to guarantee a corporate debt as well as signing in the capacity of
maker for his own loan. The court held that requiring the borrower to sign
as guarantor of the corporate loan was not usurious because the liability was
merely a secondary obligation and did not rise to the level of requiring him
139. Id.
140. Id. at 45.
141. Id. at 48-49.
142. Id. at 47.
143. Id. at 49.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 850 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
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to immediately assume payment of another's debt. 147
Perhaps the most interesting case decided during the Survey period on a
maker's defense to liability on a promissory note was First State Bank v.
Fatherlee. 148 The basic defense on which the maker ultimately prevailed was
a claim of fraud in the inducement, but the claim arose in an unusual factual
setting. The maker's father was past due on various debts to a bank. In a
scheme to repay the debts, he obtained two promissory note forms from the
bank. After obtaining the forms, he called his daughter and asked her to
come by his office to "sign some papers." Among the papers she signed were
the two blank note forms made payable to the bank. He returned the forms
to the bank and a bank employee filled in the blanks in amounts sufficient to
pay a substantial part of the father's debts. The proceeds of the notes were
then deposited into the daughter's account, but were promptly withdrawn by
the father and used to pay his own indebtedness. After the notes went into
default, the bank sued the daughter as maker of the notes. The jury found
that the daughter had been induced by fraud to sign the notes and the trial
court entered a take-nothing judgment against the bank. 149
The bank vigorously argued that the jury instruction on the elements of
fraud were incomplete, but the court of appeals upheld the instruction on the
ground there is no single definition of fraud and a listing of precise elements
of fraud was not only unnecessary in the instruction, but would be unwise
because fraud is not an exactly definable term.' 50 The bank also argued that
the maker could not assert a defense of fraud in the inducement against the
bank because the maker never dealt with the bank and it did not make any
representations or inducements to her.' 5 ' The court held that the bank was
involved in the fraudulent scheme and had received benefits from the success
of the plan. The bank, therefore, was subject to the fraudulent inducement
defense. 152 While the result in this case seems appropriate based on the
court's description of the facts, the opinion never discusses application of the
Code to these facts. The opinion leaves a vague impression that the court has
created a caselaw theory of fraudulent inducement available to makers
outside the Code. 53
147. Id. at 293. The court distinguished Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926, 928
(Tex. 1983) which held that if payment or assumption of another's existing debt is required for
the extension of credit, then the amount of the debt paid or assumed is treated as additional
interest for usury calculations.
148. 847 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 395-96.
151. Although not mentioned by the court, this argument appears to have been based on
the theory that the bank, as payee of the notes, was a holder in due course under TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) and was, therefore, free of the de-
fenses of any party with whom it had not dealt under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.305(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This latter section insulates a holder in due course
from fraud in the inducement claims.
152. 847 S.W.2d at 396.
153. The opinion is curious in this omission. Official Comment 2 to TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) contains several examples of situations in
which a payee can qualify as a holder in due course. In some of the examples, an agent of the
maker or drawer commits a fraud on the maker or drawer and the payee qualifies as a holder
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D. LIABILITY OF GUARANTORS
Like other sureties, a guarantor is entitled to assert special defenses ac-
corded to the status of suretyship, including such defenses as impairment of
collateral, release of the principal obligor, and extension of the time for pay-
ment. 154 It is good commercial practice to include provisions in a guaranty
agreement allowing the creditor to modify the terms of the original loan and
to waive the right of a guarantor to assert discharge based on such events as
impairment of collateral and renewal or extension of the loan. The benefits
of this practice were demonstrated during the Survey period in Mann v.
NCNB Texas National Bank 155 and Chambers v. NCNB Texas National
Bank.156 In both cases guarantors signed guaranty agreements allowing
changes in the structure of the original loan and, in both cases, the effective-
ness of the respective guaranties was upheld.
In FDIC v. F & A Equipment Leasing'57 and Joseph Thomas, Inc. v. Gra-
ham "158 the courts were concerned with determining the capacity in which
alleged contracts of guaranty had been signed. In F & A Equipment the
original makers claimed they had become mere sureties when two other per-
sons subsequently signed the notes for the purpose of assuming all payments
on the loans as part of the purchase of an equipment business. The court
ruled it was not clear from the face of the notes that a suretyship relation
was intended; it was equally possible that all parties had signed as comak-
ers. 159 Because of this ambiguity parol evidence was admissible to show the
agreement of the parties, but the original makers had the burden of proving
not only an agreement between them and the subsequent signers, but an
agreement with the creditor as well showing that the subsequent signers had
become primarily liable as makers and the original makers had become mere
guarantors. The court found there was insufficient evidence to find such an
agreement and the alleged makers/guarantors were not entitled to discharge
because of a claimed impairment of collateral. 160 Having lost this battle, the
original makers nonetheless won a significant part of the war by successfully
urging that they were consumers under the DTPA with respect to the lend-
ing bank and that the bank violated the Act with respect to services rendered
by the bank in providing the makers with information about the credit wor-
in due course by taking the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of the fraud.
While these examples have some facial similarity to the situation in Fatherlee, the description
of the facts contained in the opinion make it seem a relatively easy matter to conclude the bank
had notice of the fraud, thereby depriving it of holder in due course status. Likewise, the court
could seemingly have treated this as a case of material alteration under TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.407(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) because it was undisputed that an employee
of the bank filled in the blanks. There is no indication in the opinion why these points were not
addressed.
154. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
155. 854 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
156. 841 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
157. 854 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (opinion on remand).
158. 842 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
159. 854 S.W.2d at 686.
160. Id. at 689.
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thiness of the new signers.' 6 t
In Joseph Thomas, Inc. 162 a subcontractor contended the general contrac-
tor had agreed to indemnify the property owner from claims by subcontrac-
tors. Upon examination of the document in question, the court concluded
instead that the general contractor had entered into a guaranty agreement
rather than an indemnity agreement. 163 While the subcontractor might have
been protected under either type of agreement, the critical difference be-
tween them for purposes of this case was when the statute of limitations
began to run. According to the court, under an indemnity agreement, limi-
tations would begin only after a final judgment was rendered in favor of the
subcontractor against the owner. 164 Under a guaranty agreement, limita-
tions would begin to run upon accrual of a cause of action by the subcontrac-
tor.' 6 Because the court regarded this agreement as one of guaranty rather
than indemnity, the subcontractor was barred by limitations because the ac-
tion was brought more than four years after the cause of action accrued. 166
V. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PAYOR BANK AND ITS CUSTOMER
The only significant Chapter 4 decision reported during the Survey period
was significant indeed. In Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. First Bank 167 a
business customer obtained a series of commercial loans from a bank secured
by deeds of trust on various real estate owned by the customer. The cus-
tomer also had two checking accounts at the same bank, an operating ac-
count and a payroll account. Over a period of months, the customer wrote
several insufficient funds checks on these accounts, but the overdrafts were
paid by the bank and a twenty dollar service charge was assessed for each
overdraft. Eventually the overdraft charges amounted to some forty-seven
thousand dollars. The charges were ultimately "rolled-over" into the cus-
tomer's outstanding commercial loan. When the customer defaulted on the
commercial loan, the bank foreclosed on part of the real property. In a
lender liability action against the bank, the customer initially alleged several
theories of recovery including undue influence, negligence, DTPA violations,
and usury. 168 After trial, a directed verdict was entered against the plaintiff
on several of these theories, including usury, and judgment was rendered
against the customer on the remaining theories. The customer appealed only
the directed verdict on the usury theory.
The essence of this theory was that the bank committed usury by charging
a twenty dollar fee for each overdraft and for most, if not all, of the over-
161. Id. at 690-9 1.
162. 842 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
163. Id. at 345-46.
164. Id. at 345.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 346-47.
167. 857 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
168. Id. at 583-84.
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drafts this fee was in excess of the interest allowed by law. 169 The court
analyzed this theory as involving three questions: (1) Is payment of an over-
draft a loan of money?, (2) Does a customer incur an absolute obligation to
repay the amount of an overdraft?, and (3) Is the fee assessed for the service
of paying an overdraft greater than that allowed by law?
The court noted that Section 4.401 of the Code 170 expressly allows a payor
bank to pay an overdraft and charge the amount of the overdraft against the
customer.1 7' In addition to the statutory authorization permitting over-
drafts, there was testimony by a retired banker that an overdraft was essen-
tially a loan to the customer between the time the overdraft was paid and the
time when the bank was reimbursed by the customer. Based on both the
statutory authorization for overdrafts and on the evidence in the record, the
court held the overdrafts amounted to loans.' 72
As to the obligation of a customer to repay the amount of an overdraft,
officials of both the customer and the bank testified to their understanding
that the overdrafts would be paid. The actual practice between the parties
also showed that the customer routinely made deposits to cover overdrafts
paid by the bank. The court held this evidence showed an obligation to
repay.' 73
The most difficult issue was whether the service fee charged for each over-
draft was an interest charge in excess of the amount permitted by law. On
this issue, the court noted that the general test for usury is whether the
charge is for "any distinctly separate and additional consideration, other
than the simple lending of money."' 74 If the charge is based on such sepa-
rate consideration, it is not a charge of interest within the meaning of the
usury statutes. The court held that whether the charge of special fees in
connection with a loan transaction constitutes a charging of interest is
treated as a question of fact under Texas law. 175 Because there was sufficient
evidence in the record for a jury to conclude the service charges were not
169. Absent an interest rate agreed to by the parties, the maximum rate that can be
charged is six percent. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987). The court
noted that most of the overdrafts ranged from one-hundred to three-hundred dollars and that
the overdraft amounts were repaid in one to eight days. A twenty-dollar charge on a one to
eight day loan for amounts of this type would translate into very high percentages (if such
charges can properly be treated as interest).
170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
171. 857 S.W.2d at 584-85. The court also cited the earlier cases of Williams v. Cullen Ctr.
Bank & Trust, 685 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1985) and Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d
761, 763 n.2 (Tex. 1982) for the proposition that payment of an overdraft constitutes a loan to
a customer.
172. 857 S.W.2d at 585.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 586.
175. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the following cases involving the
charge of special fees as part of the transaction: Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Free-
man, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976) (fact question of whether "loan fee" was a lawful com-
mitment fee or interest); Dryden v. City Nat'l Bank, 666 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fact question of whether charge for credit life insurance was
usurious when added to interest on loan); Eckols v. Savine Bank, 613 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (fact issue if twenty-five dollar fee in connection with
car loan was interest).
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related to the actual cost of processing an overdraft and represented a return
of interest on the loans instead, the case was remanded for trial on the usury
issue. ' 76
Tony's Tortilla Factory presents banks with a difficult problem. The most
obvious solution is legislative action approving overdraft charges in some
fixed amount or according to some formula, but this solution must await the
next legislative session. In the meantime, a bank could simply refuse to pay
overdrafts, but this could present a serious customer relations problem. An-
other approach would be to have agreements with customers to honor over-
drafts at a specified legal rate of interest or to have accurate information
demonstrating the actual cost of processing an overdraft to show the fee
charged did not result in an income yield to the bank.
VI. FUNDS TRANSFERS
The primary focus of the new Chapter 4A is a specialized form of elec-
tronic fund transfer commonly called a "wholesale wire transfer,"' 77
although the Chapter also covers other types of funds transfers that are not
necessarily processed by electronic means.' 78 The Chapter specifically ex-
cludes funds transfers to the extent they are covered by the federal Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act. 179 The main purpose of the federal act is the
regulation of consumer transactions, such as withdrawals from automatic
teller machines and point-of-sale transfers through the use of debit cards.' 0
The best way to understand the scope of Chapter 4A and to identify the
principal issues with which it deals is by describing a typical funds transfer
situation. Debtor owes a debt to Creditor. Instead of paying the debt by
check, Debtor sends an instruction to her bank, First Bank, telling the bank
to credit the appropriate amount of money to Creditor who has an account
at Second Bank. First Bank carries out Debtor's instruction by telling Sec-
ond Bank to credit the specified sum to Creditor's account at Second Bank.
Second Bank carries out the instruction from First Bank. In this situation,
Chapter 4A identifies Debtor as the "sender" of a "payment order" with
respect to the instruction sent to First Bank.' 8 ' First Bank is termed a "re-
ceiving bank" with respect to Debtor's instruction.182 When First Bank in-
structs Second Bank to credit the account held by Creditor in Second Bank,
First Bank becomes a "sender" with respect to that instruction and Second
Bank is now a "receiving bank" with respect to that same instruction. 8 3
Because the instruction by First Bank merely helps to effectuate the original
176. Id. at 591.
177. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.102 Cmt. (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
178. See id. § 4A.104 Cmt. 6.
179. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The
federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act appears at 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
181. "Sender" and "payment order" are defined respectively in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE.
ANN §§ 4A.103(a)(5), 4.103(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
182. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.103(a)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).




instruction given by Debtor, Debtor becomes an "originator" when this in-
struction is given by First Bank.' 84 Creditor is denominated the "benefici-
ary" of both the instruction by Debtor and the instruction by First Bank.' 85
When First Bank carries out the instruction from Debtor, it is said to have
"executed" that instruction. 86 When Second Bank credits funds to Credi-
tor's account, it has "accepted" the instruction from First Bank.' 87 Second
Bank is entitled to payment from First Bank in the amount of the credit
added to Creditor's account and First Bank is entitled to payment from
Debtor for the amount paid to Second Bank as specified in Debtor's instruc-
tion.18 8 In most instances, the instructions sent by First Bank to Second
Bank are likely to be by electronic means through the Federal Reserve wire
transfer network (Fedwire) or through the New York Clearing House In-
terbank Payments Systems (CHIPS) to facilitate immediate payment of the
amount specified in the instructions. The "bank to bank" aspect of the situa-
tion described above is the genesis of the term "wholesale wire transfer."
Chapter 4A is not limited, however, to electronic transfers and will also ap-
ply to transfers effected by other means, including ordinary first class mail.
While a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this Survey, it is possible
to identify some of the principal issues covered by the rules of Chapter 4A.
As might be expected, there are risks of loss that could occur at several
points in the course of a funds transfer. These include such matters as the
incorrect identification of the beneficiary or an incorrect statement of the
amount to be transferred to the beneficiary in an initial payment order. An
incorrect identification or incorrect statement of amount could be either a
mistake or the result of deliberate fraud. Chapter 4A has several provisions
dealing with the issue and acceptance of payment orders, including provi-
sions relating to security procedures, that attempt to allocate such risks by
the authentication of payment orders. 18 9 Even if a payment order is
originated correctly, errors might occur between banks during the execution
of the order. Such errors obviously involve the potential liability of a bank in
the execution of a payment order and are dealt with in Chapter 4A.190
Rights to payment are an integral part of the funds transfer process in each
step of the transfer and these are dealt with as well.' 9' Externalities, such as
bank failure, bankruptcy, and creditor process, may interrupt the progress of
a funds transfer. To the extent possible, Chapter 4A attempts to prevent
interruption of a funds transfer already in progress or to allocate loss if the
transfer cannot be completed. 9 2 Because funds transfers are often interstate
184. Id. § 4A.104(3).
185. Id. § 4A.103(2).
186. Id. § 4A.301.
187. Id. § 4A.209.
188. See id. § 4A.406 Cmt. 6.
189. See id. §§ 4A.201-4A.212.
190. See id. §§ 4A.301-4A.305.
191. See id. §§ 4A.401-4A.406.
192. As a matter of state law, Chapter 4A can prevent some interruptions caused by credi-
tor process, such as injunctions or garnishment orders. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 4A.502, 4A.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994) contain rules limiting such interruptions.
[Vol. 47
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
or international in scope, Chapter 4A also contains an elaborate choice of
law provision to determine the law applicable to the various parties involved
in a funds transfer. 193
VII. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
In Coastal Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 194 a plaintiff buyer sued for
breach of a contract to sell securities based on a memorandum of sale pre-
pared by the sellers and sent to the buyer shortly after negotiations were
concluded. The memorandum, however, was not signed by the sellers and
included a paragraph specifying that it was not binding until it was signed by
all of the parties. 195 The court held that the unsigned memorandum failed
to satisfy the statute of frauds requirements of the Code and was, therefore,
unenforceable.196 The plaintiff made an alternative argument that promis-
sory estoppel should bar the sellers from asserting the statute of frauds. As
to this argument the court held that Texas law limits the use of promissory
estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds only when a party promises
to sign a written contract that is already in existence when the promise is
made. 197 Because the contract in question had not been reduced to writing
when the sellers allegedly agreed to sign a contract, the promissory estoppel
exception was not applicable.' 98 The buyer also claimed the sellers had tor-
tiously interfered with formation of the contract and had fraudulently in-
duced the buyer to enter into the contract. The court rejected the claim of
tortious interference by pointing out that a party cannot tortiously interfere
with a contract to which it is itself a party; at most it might be liable for
breach of contract.' 99 The claim of fraudulent inducement was likewise re-
jected because the alleged misrepresentations never resulted in the formation
of a contract; the subjective belief of the buyer that a contract had been
formed did not give rise to a valid fraudulent inducement claim. 2°°
VIII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CREATION AND PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Chapter 9 of the Code attempts to simplify the perfection of security inter-
Federal law, or course, will override Chapter 4A in cases of bank failure or bankruptcy, but
Chapter 4A can still establish some rights of the parties unless federal law compels a different
result. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4A.502(d), 4A.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1994) contain some rules establishing such rights, but recognizes that these rules may be inef-
fective depending on action taken by the federal reserve. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4A. 107 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994) expressly stating that Chapter 4A is subject
to regulations and operating circulars of the federal reserve.
193. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4A.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
194. 852 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
195. The paragraph is set out in full in the opinion. See id. at 717.
196. Id. at 717-18. The statute of frauds requirement for the sale of investment securities
appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
197. 852 S.W.2d at 718-19.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 720.
200. Id. at 720-21.
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ests in personal property by allowing parties to use a "reasonable descrip-
tion" of collateral in their security agreements and financing statements
instead of requiring extensive detailed descriptions. 20 1 This is accomplished
in part by a fairly elaborate scheme for classifying collateral under Chapter 9
into various categories, such as inventory, equipment, accounts, and the
like. 20 2 While this arrangement is satisfactory for many standardized trans-
actions, it sometimes breaks down when a transaction involves collateral
that cannot be readily classified under the classification scheme. This diffi-
culty was illustrated in Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Omnibank, N.A. ,203 and
in In re Newman.20 4 In Orix a secured party took a security interest in all of
a debtor's "goods, chattels, machinery, equipment, inventory, accounts,
chattel paper, notes receivable, accounts receivable, furniture, fixtures and
property of every kind and nature, wherever located, now or hereafter be-
longing to [mortgagor]. ' 20 5 A copy of the security agreement was properly
filed as a financing statement. 20 6 The debtor subsequently sold all of his
stock in the business and, as part of the sale, signed a covenant not to com-
pete under which he was to receive a series of payments for five years after
the sale. A second secured creditor took a security interest in the proceeds
the debtor was to receive under the noncompetition agreement. The security
agreement and the financing statement covering this loan specifically identi-
fied the contract under which the noncompetition payments were to be
made. The first secured creditor claimed it had a superior right to payments
under the noncompetition agreement because of its earlier filing. On appeal
the court held that, despite the earlier filing, the description of collateral was
insufficient to create a security interest in the proceeds of the noncompetition
agreement. 20 7 The court reasoned the phrase "property of every kind and
nature, wherever located" referred only to tangible property because intangi-
ble property, such as a right to payment, does not have a physical location
and, therefore, did not cover rights to payment. 20 8 The court also held that
the interest claimed in "accounts" did not cover proceeds of the noncompeti-
tion agreement because accounts are defined as a "right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered" and there were no goods sold
or leased and no services to be rendered under the covenant not to com-
pete. 20 9 The court opined that the proper classification of such a right to
payment was a "general intangible. ' 210 Ironically, this was virtually the only
201. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.110 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
202. The several categories established by Chapter 9 are defined in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A. 105, 9A. 106, 9A. 109 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
203. 858 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
204. 993 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1993).
205. 858 S.W.2d at 588.
206. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) permits the
filing of a security agreement as a financing statement if the agreement contains the necessary
requisites.
207. 858 S.W.2d at 594.
208. Id. at 591.
209. Id. at 593-94 (citing TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991)).
210. 858 S.W.2d. at 594.
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collateral classification omitted from the description in the first security
agreement.
A similar question arose in In re Newman 211 where a secured party took a
security interest in an annuity contract and attempted to perfect the interest
by taking an assignment of the annuity. When the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy, the trustee contended the security interest was unperfected because
the annuity contract was a general intangible requiring filing for perfection.
The secured party argued the certificate of assignment qualified as an "in-
strument" under Chapter 9 and possession was the appropriate method of
perfection. The court applied what it termed a "reasonable professional
standard" to determine if annuities are regularly traded by professionals or
regarded as transferable by indorsement or by transfer of possession so as to
qualify as "instruments. ' 212 The court found no indication in the record
that annuities were so regarded and classified the annuities, therefore, as
general intangibles.213 Since no filing had been made to cover the annuities,
the security interest was unperfected and the trustee was entitled to avoid
the security interest. 214
B. ACTIONS IN CONVERSION
Section 9.306 of the Code allows a security interest to continue in collat-
eral even after disposition of the collateral by the debtor unless the disposi-
tion is authorized by the secured party or by a specific provision in Chapter
9. 2 15 In Amarillo National Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah America, Inc.216 a se-
cured party held a properly perfected security interest in all of a debtor's
inventory. The debtor subsequently transferred to a supplier all inventory
that had been obtained from the supplier. The secured party sued the sup-
plier for conversion claiming a superior interest in the inventory on the basis
of section 9.306. While it was clear the supplier could have obtained a
purchase money security interest when the inventory was first sold to the
debtor that would have had priority over the bank, it was equally clear the
supplier had not done so. The supplier contended, however, that the secured
party had authorized the sale by the terms of the security agreement which
permitted the transfer of "goods identified herein as inventory. '217 The
court interpreted this clause to authorize transfers of inventory in the ordi-
nary course of business as suggested in the definition of inventory in the Offi-
211. 993 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1993).
212. Id. at 94.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 95. The court noted that, "This case painfully illustrates the problems that
creditors encounter when they fail to account for Article 9 problems. The best practice in
cases where a precise categorization is elusive, would be to comply with both requirements.
Creditors who foresee Article 9 problems when acquiring collateral are 'handsomely rewarded
for their knowledge of the breadth of Article 9.' " 993 F.2d at 94 n.7 (quoting in part from
Barkley Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1.03
(2d Ed. 1988)).
215. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
216. 991 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1993).
217. Id. at 275.
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cial Comment to Section 9.109 of the Code. 218 Because the supplier did not
acquire the inventory in the ordinary course of business, but as partial satis-
faction of a debt owed to the supplier, the security interest continued in the
collateral and the supplier was liable for converting the inventory. 219
In another conversion action by a secured party, the creditor sought to
recover from a debtor and a stock broker for failure of those parties to re-
place pledged securities with securities of approximately equal value. 220 The
principal issue in the case was whether the secured party had given the
debtor either actual or apparent authority to deal with the securities as he
saw fit and whether evidence in the record supported a trial court judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the broker. 22 1 The court held the
evidence in the record, coupled with the broker's failure to assert the agency
defense at trial, could not support the agency defense and a judgment
N.O.V. and instructed the trial court to enter a judgment on the jury verdict
in favor of the secured party.222
In Whitaker v. Bank of El Paso 223 a conversion claim was asserted by the
alleged buyer of eight used mobile homes against a secured party who repos-
sessed the mobile homes under a writ of sequestration before the buyer took
physical possession of them. Faced with a record that the court termed "far
from a model of clarity, '224 the court held the conversion action failed be-
cause the alleged buyer failed to show either a demand or a refusal to return
any particular identified mobile home.225 The only evidence bearing on the
question of a demand was a letter from the alleged buyer to the secured
party requesting information about the mobile homes and a deposition state-
ment by the alleged buyer that he had sent the letter and "they chose to
ignore it and I figured to hell with them, and I filed the suit."'226 The secured
party responded with a request for additional information for the debtor to
identify the mobile homes in question, but received no response. The court
held the alleged buyer failed to establish the required elements of a conver-
sion claim.227
C. PRIORITY DISPUTES
Perhaps the most intellectually challenging case decided during the Sur-
vey period was Citizens National Bank v. Cockrell,228 where the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the previously unanswered question of whether a
debtor's possession of collateral must be exclusive to begin the running of the
218. Id. at 276. The court referred to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109 Cmt. 3 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1991), as the source of this interpretation.
219. 991 F.2d at 278.
220. Allied Bank-West, N.A. v. Stein, 996 F.2d III (5th Cir. 1993).
221. Id. at 113-14.
222. Id. at 116.
223. 850 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
224. Id. at 759.
225. Id. at 761-62.
226. Id. at 761.
227. Id. at 762.
228. 850 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. 1993).
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twenty day time period for filing under Section 9.312(d). 229 In Cockrell the
secured party sold a mini-blind manufacturing business to the debtor, in-
cluding the equipment used in the manufacturing process. Although the
debtor began operating the business on August 1st, the sale date, the seller
retained a set of keys to the premises and actively assisted the debtor in
learning how to use the equipment and operate the business until October
3rd. On that date the seller turned the keys over to the debtor and the
debtor assumed exclusive possession of the premises and equipment. The
seller filed a financing statement on October 7th. In a priority dispute be-
tween the secured seller and a bank which held a general security interest
covering all equipment acquired by the debtor, the seller argued that the
twenty day period for filing did not begin to run until the debtor had exclu-
sive possession and control of the equipment on October 3rd. The court held
the proper test for determining if the debtor had sufficient possession to trig-
ger the twenty day time period is "the impression conveyed to an observer
not involved in the transaction, not ... private limitations contained in the
contract between the buyer and seller. '" 230 The Court ruled the debtor had
acquired sufficient ostensible possession of the equipment on August 1st to
trigger the twenty day time period. Because the seller delayed filing beyond
this period, the Court held the purchase money security interest did not
qualify for a first-priority position and the general secured creditor who had
filed earlier had the superior claim to the equipment.2 31
In Western Auto Supply Co. v. Brazosport Bank 232 a bank holding a first
priority position in a debtor's inventory, accounts receivable, equipment, and
fixtures agreed to subordinate its priority to a second secured party. The
second secured party subsequently assigned its rights in the subordination
agreement to yet another secured party. During the next two years, the
third secured party advanced additional funds to the debtor which had the
effect of increasing the debt owed by the debtor to that secured party. Ulti-
mately, the debtor defaulted on its obligations to the bank and to the third
secured party. The court held the issue was whether the bank intended the
subordination agreement to be assignable to a third party who could create
new debt that effectively further subordinated the bank's security interest. 233
Based on the language of the subordination agreement the court ruled that
further assignment of the agreement was not contemplated by the bank and
the new debt incurred in favor of the third secured creditor was subject to
the bank's first priority position. 234
229. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) allows a twenty
day time period after the debtor receives possession of collateral for a financing statement to be
filed for priority purposes against a previously perfected security interest. The author has
previously noted that this twenty day time period can be a trap for the unwary because of the
ten day limitation contained in the federal Bankruptcy Code. See John Krahmer, Commercial
Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 119, 142-43 (1991).
230. 850 S.W.2d at 465.
231. Id. at 466.
232. 840 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1992, no writ).




D. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL FOLLOWING DEFAULT
In Thomas v. Price235 a debtor argued that a private foreclosure sale under
Section 9.504 of the Code should be nullified because the purchaser of the
collateral had not purchased the collateral in good faith. 236 Finding no
Texas cases on this point, the court considered decisions from other jurisdic-
tions and concluded the good faith or bad faith of a purchaser was relevant
only if the disposition of the collateral was not commercially reasonable
under Section 9.504.237 Because the notice of sale and the sale itself met the
standards of commercial reasonableness under the Code, the court held
there was no basis for setting aside the sale even if the purchaser had acted in
bad faith.238
In Lake Forest Developments v. FDIC239 the debtor directly challenged
the commercial reasonableness of a sale where the public advertisement of
the sale proposed to sell twenty-one promissory notes in bulk at public auc-
tion and stated the range of principal amounts and interest rates, but did not
specify the makers, principal amounts, interest rates, or maturity rates of the
individual notes. The court held the advertisement was sufficient to attract
the attention of interested bidders and any bidders could have obtained more
specific information from the seller either before or at the time of the sale. 24 °
The court ruled as a matter of law that the sale was advertised and con-
ducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 24'
In FDIC v. Moore242 a guarantor contended the secured party was not
entitled to sue for a deficiency because of failure to notify her of the proposed
sale of collateral. The court agreed that guarantors are included within the
term "debtor" under section 9.504 and are, therefore, entitled to notice of
sale of collateral. 243 The court also agreed that failure to give notice will bar
recovery of a deficiency. 244 The court did not agree, however, that the guar-
antor met the proof requirements to obtain a summary judgment on this
issue because of a procedural error in the submission of three depositions
showing that notice was never received. 245 Judgment in favor of the guaran-
235. 975 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1992).
236. Id. at 237-38. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(c), 9.504(d) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991) prescribes the requirements for a sale of collateral under Chapter 9 and the
effect of a purchaser's lack of good faith.
237. 975 F.2d at 239. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991) requires that notice of sale and the sale itself be "commercially reasonable."
238. 975 F.2d at 240.
239. 989 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1993).
240. Id. at 201.
241. Id.
242. 846 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
243. Id. at 495-96. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991); see also Adams v. Waldrop, 740 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ);
Carroll v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 734 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, no writ); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi, writ ref'd n.r.e.), per curiam, 716 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1986); and Peck v. Mack
Trucks, 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
244. 846 S.W.2d at 495. The "deficiency bar rule" was originally adopted in Texas in the
case of Tannenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
245. 846 S.W.2d at 496.
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tor was reversed and the case was remanded for trial. 246
In Greathouse v. Charter National Bank 24 7 the Texas Supreme Court an-
nounced rules allocating the burdens of pleading and proving the commer-
cial reasonableness of a sale of collateral. 24 8 Greathouse was applied in
SRSB-IV, Ltd. v. Continental Savings Association,249 where the court held it
was error to require a guarantor to prove that a sale was not commercially
reasonable instead of placing the burden of proof on the secured party.2 50
246. Id.
247. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
248. The rules announced in Greathouse are discussed in the 1992 Annual Survey. See
John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV.
1095, 1121-22 (1993).
249. 979 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993).
250. Id. at 40.
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